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Scott-McLaughlin: Voting Rights Act
ACT AND THE "NEW AND
TIHE VOTING RIGHTS
IMPROVED" INTENT TEST: OLD WINE IN NEW
BOTTLES

Randolph M. Scott-McLaughlin*
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the Supreme Court injected the issue of intent into the voting
rights arena in Mobile v. Bolden,' there has been a long and persistent
struggle to reverse that decision. In 1982, Congress thought it had put
the question of the quantum and quality of proof required to establish

a violation of section 2 of the Voting Rights Act- to rest when
Congress amended that section? However, the courts quickly began
* Professor of Law, Pace University; Director, Social Justice Center, Pace Law

School. B.A., Columbia University (1975); J.D., Harvard University (1978).
I wish to thank my research assistant, Linda M. Lin, for her assistance during the
research phase of this article. I also wish to thank the staff of the Social Justice
Center (Debra Cohen, staff attorney; Susan Scaria, Debra Jones, and Paulette
Bainbridge, interns) for their assistance during the editing phase of this project.
1446 U.S. 55 (1980).
2 Section2 of the Voting Rights Act, as amended in 1982, provides:
(a) No voting qualification or prerequisiteto voting or standard, practice, or
procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision
in a manner which results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any
citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color, or in
contravention of the guarantees set forth in section 1973 b(f)(2), as provided
in subsection (b).
A violation of subsection (a) is established if, based on the totality of
(b)
circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading to nomination
or election in the State or political subdivision are not equally open to
participationby members of a class of citizens protected by subsection (a) in
that its members have less opportunity than other members of the electorate
to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their
choice. The extent to which members of a protected class have been elected
to office in the State or political subdivision is one circumstance which may
be considered: Provided, that nothing in this section establishes a right to
have members of a protected class elected in numbers equal to their
proportion in the population.
42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1982).
3 See, e.g., James F. Blumstein, Defining and Proving Race Discrimination:
Perspectiveson the Purposevs. Results Approach From the Voting Rights Act, 69
Va. L. Rev. 633 (1983); Andrew P. Miller and Mark A. Packman, AmendedSection
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a rear guard action to undermine congressional efforts to eliminate
the intent requirement as an element of a plaintiff s claim. Both the
Supreme Court and the circuit courts have played various roles in the
effort to re-assert the intent test in, albeit, a "new and improved"
form. Despite Congress' best efforts, the intent test is back. The role
of scholars and practitioners is to understand the new test and
determine how to satisfy this most stringent requirement. In this
article, the contours of the new test will be examined and the
question of what proof is required to satisfy the test will be explored.
Part II will discuss the Mobile decision and congressional efforts to
eliminate the intent test from section 2. Part III will explore the
several opinions in Thornburg where the question of the intent of
Congress when it amended section 2 was discussed. Finally, in Part
IV, the circuit court decisions, essentially adopting Justice
O'Connor's opinion, will be analyzed to determine the contours of
the new intent test and the elements of proof required to meet it.
This article concludes that the courts "got it wrong" when they reintroduced the intent standard, and that Congress intended to banish
intent as a requirement of a plaintiff's case. However, recognizing
that practitioners must live with what is, and not what ought to be,
2 ofthe Voting Rights Act: What is the Intent ofthe Results Test?, 36 Emory L.J. 1
(1987); Frank R. Parker, The 'Results' Test ofSection 2 of the Voting Rights Act:
Abandoning the Intent Standard,69 Va. L. Rev. 715 (1983); Randolph M. ScottMcLaughlin, Chisom v. Roemer: Where Do We Go FromHere?, 24 Colum. Hum.
Rts. L. Rev I (1993).
4 In Thornburgv. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986), a debate raged between Justices
Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens, and O'Connor,
joined by Justices Powell, Rehnquist and Chief Justice Burger, over whether there

was any vestige of the intent standard in the amended section 2. Justice Brennan
believed that Congress meant to banish intent evidence from the vote dilution
inquiry, whereas Justice O'Connor opined that intent proof should not be excluded
from a section 2 challenge to an at-large election system. The Gingles decision is
discussed infra in Part Three. The circuit courts that have considered this issue have
all agreed with Justice O'Connor's view that intent proof was relevant to the
inquiry under the totality of circumstances standard. See, e.g., Goosby v. Town
Board of the Town of Hempstead, 180 F.3d 476, (2nd. Cir. 1999)(intent proof
relevant to overall vote dilution inquiry); accordLewis v. Alamance County, 99 F.
3d 600 (4th Cir. 1996); see also Milwaukee Branch of the NAACP v. Thompson,
116 F.3d 1194 (7th Cir. 1997); Vecinos De Barrio Uno v. City of Holyoke, 72 F.3d
973 (1st. Cir. 1995); Nipper v. Smith, 39 F.3d 1494 (11 th Cir. 1994); Sanchez v.
Colorado, 97 F.3d 1303 (1996); cf League of United Latin Citizens v. Clements,
999 F. 2d 831 (5th Cir. 1993) (en banc).
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the article theorizes that the new test is not as difficult to prove as the
old intent test.
HI.

THE RISE AND FALL OF THE INTENT STANDARD:
FROM MOBILE TO CONGRESS.
A. TIE MOBILE DECISION

In Mobile v. Bolden,5 the Supreme Court addressed the question of
the type of proof required to establish a violation of both section 2 of
the Voting Rights Act6 and the Fifteenth Amendment7 to the United

States Constitution

The opinion focused primarily on the

parameters of the Fifteenth Amendment's protections, but also
discussed the standard of proof for the section 2 claim as well.
Essentially, the Court expressed its belief that both the statutory and
constitutional claim should be governed by the same standard
The Court concluded that the language of section 2 merely
elaborated on that of the Fifteenth Amendment, and that the statutory
provision was intended to have the same effect as the Amendment
- 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
6At the time of the Mobile decision, section 2 provided:
No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or
procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State of political subdivision
to deny or abridge the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on
account of race or color.
42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1965).
' Section 1 of the Fifteenth Amendment provides that "[t]he right of citizens of
the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by
any State on account of race, color, or previous condition ofservitude."
s Mobile, 446 U.S. 55. African-American citizens of that city brought a class
action challenging the constitutionality of the at-large method of electing Mobile's
City Commission as a violation of both section 2 and the Fifteenth Amendment.
446 U.S. at 58. The District Court, without ruling on the statutory claim, concluded
that the constitutionalrights of the plaintiffs and the class they represented had been
violated and ordered the creation of a single-member district plan. Id. The Fifth
Circuitupheld the district court's opinion. Id
9 Mobile, 446 U.S. at 60. The Court was critical of the failure of the lower courts
to address the statutory claim as they were required to by general principles of
judicial administration. Id, citing Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. McLaughlin, 323
U.S. 101, 105 (1944). Nevertheless,the Court concluded that statutory claim added
nothingto the plaintiffs' complaint. Id
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itself.'" While noting that the legislative history of section 2 was
sparse, the Court observed that the view that this section merely
restated the prohibitions of the Fifteenth Amendment was expressed
without contradiction during the hearings on the Voting Rights Act
that held in the Senate. After its review of the legislative history of
section 2, the Court determined that that section of the Voting Rights
Act and the Fifteenth Amendment were coterminous."
The Court turned its attention to a delineation of the scope of the
Fifteenth Amendment and the standard of proof required to establish
a violation of the amendment. 2 As a threshold matter, the Court
noted that it was clear that action by a state that is racially neutral
violates the Fifteenth Amendment only if motivated by a
discriminatory purpose. 3 The Court also found support for this
theory of the Fifteenth Amendment in cases involving the
establishment of political boundaries 14 and in the reapportionment
context'" From its review of cases decided under the Fifteenth
"oMobile, 446 U.S. at 61.
"Id.
12 Id. at 61-62.
13 Id.(citing Guinn v. U.S., 238 U.S. 347 (1915)). Guinn involved a challenge to
a "grandfather" clause that exempted from Oklahoma's literacy requirement
persons who were entitled to vote before January 1, 1866, or the descendants of
such persons. The Guinn Court concluded that the grandfather clause was
unconstitutional because it was not "possible to discover any basis in reason for the
standard... other than the purpose" of circumventing the Fifteenth Amendment.
Id at 365.
"See Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960). Gomillion was a challenge to
a 1957 Alabama statute that redefined the city boundaries of Tuskegee, Alabama.
The effect of the statute was to transmute Tuskegee's borders from a square into an
irregular shaped polygon, which removed from the city almost all of the AfricanAmerican voters, and not one white voter. Id. at 341. The Gomillion Court held
that allegations of a racially motivated gerrymander of a city's boundaries stated a
valid claim under the Fifteenth Amendment. Id. According to the Court in Mobile,
the decision in Gomillion stands for the proposition that in the absence of an
invidious, racially discriminatory motive, a state was constitutionally free to redraw
political boundaries without federal court intervention. Mobile, 446 U.S. at 63.
"sSee Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52 (1964). In Wright, the plaintiffs
challenged certain congressional district lines drawn by the New York State
Legislature following the 1960 census. The complaint charged that minority
residents had been overly concentrated (packed) into certain districts. The Supreme
Court upheld the dismissal of the complaint on the grounds that the plaintiffs had
failed to prove that the legislature was motivated by racial considerations when it
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Amendment, the Court held that racially discriminatory motivation
was a necessary ingredient of a claim alleging violation of the
6
Amendment.'
With respect to the constitutionality of multimember districts, the
Court stated that it had never held such districts unconstitutional per
se. 7 The Court acknowledged that such legislative reapportionment
could violate the Fourteenth Amendment if their purpose was "to
minimize or cancel out the voting potential of racial or ethnic
minorities."' 8 In order to establish such a claim, the plaintiff "must
prove that the disputed plan was conceived or operated as [a]
[purposeful] device to furtherracial... discrimination."' 9 According
to the Court, this burden of proof allocation was required under the
Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause which prohibits
only purposeful discrimination.?
Despite its conclusion that discriminatory purpose was a
prerequisite to a claim of a Fifteenth or Fourteenth Amendment
claim, the Court conceded that proof of a-statute's impact may be
relevant to a constitutional challenge.2' Nevertheless, the Court
concludedthat in a challenge to an entire system of local governance,
"where the character of the law is readily explainable on grounds"
other than race, disproportionate impact alone is not sufficient to
establish a constitutional claim.' According to the Court in Mobile,
courts must look to other evidence to support a finding of
discriminatorypurpose.? While the Court was clear that intent proof
was required to establish a Fifteenth Amendment claim, it failed to

drew the challenged congressional lines or that the districts had, in fact, had been
drawn along racial lines. Id. at 56.
16 Mobile, 446 U.S. at 62.
'7 See e.g., Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124 (1971); White v. Regester, 412
U.S.
8 755 (1973).
' Mobile, 446 U.S. at 66.
'9
Id.
20 Id.at 66-67.
2 See Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252,266
(1977) (finding that the impact of the official action - whether it bears more
heavily on one race than another - may provide an important starting point in
determining racially discriminatory purpose).
22 Mobile 446 U.S. at 70.
23Id.
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state what type of proof would suffice to meet the high burden of
proof it required.
Justice White in his dissent believed that the Court's decision was
a radical departure from its Fifteenth Amendment jurisprudence. 4
He noted that in White v. Regester,' the Court had unanimously held
that the use of multi-member districts in two counties in Texas
violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
because, based on a totality of the circumstances, the districts
excluded minority voters from effective political participation.26 In
Justice White's opinion, the decision in Mobile was flatly
inconsistent with White.' He stated that, contrary to the Court's
opinion in Mobile, invidious discriminatory purpose could be
inferred from proof, under the totality of the circumstances, of
objective factors of the kind relied on in White.28
Mobile was a retreat from the Court's earlier decisions in White
and Whitcomb. In both cases, the Court did not require specific proof
of intent. Rather, the Court adopted an approach that required
examination of a myriad of objective factors to establish proof of a
constitutional violation.29 In Mobile, the Court tried to harmonize the
24

Id. at 94.

'5412

26

U.S. 755 (1973).

1d. at 95.
27Id. at 101.
28

Regester, 412 U.S. at 766-67. In affirming the district court's opinion, the

Court in White relied on proof of a history of racial discrimination in Texas, which
touched on the right of African-Americans to register and vote and to participate in
the democratic process, the use of a majority vote requirement, the use of a "place"
rule limiting candidacy for a legislative office from a multimember district to a
specified place on the ballot, the lack of minority success at the polls, exclusion of
minorities from the slating process employed by a white dominated organization
that effectively controlled the nomination of Democratic candidates, and the use of
racial appeals. Id.
29 The Fifth Circuit in Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297, 1305 (5th Cir.
1973), affdper curiam sub nom East Carroll Parish School Board v. Marshall, 424
U.S. 636 (1976), developed a specific set of factors, gleaned from the Whitcorb

and White decisions:
[W]here a minority can demonstrate a lack of access to the process of
slating candidates, the unresponsiveness of legislators to their particularized
interests, a tenuous state policy underlying the preference for multi-member
or at-large districting, or that the existence of past discrimination in general
precludes the effective participation in the election system, a strong case is
made. Such proof is enhanced by a showing of the existence of large
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Fifteenth Amendment jurisprudence with the case law under the
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, wherein intent
proof was required." However, the Court gave little guidance to
lower courts as to how to apply this new test in the context of a
statutory challenge to a multi-member district. The Court did not
state that a plaintiff had to prove that individual legislators were
racists. Nor did the Court discuss how a plaintiff could prove that the
legislature itself was motivated by a discriminatory purpose. Nor did
the Court discuss what role, if any, proof of racism in the electorate
should play in the determination of a constitutional or statutory
violation. In effect, by equating proof under section 2 with the
stringent requirements of the equal protection clause, the Court
unsettled voting rights law. In an effort to rectify this defeat, the civil
rights community turned to Congress to correct the Court's
misinterpretation of section 2.
B. CONGRESSIONAL EFFORTS TO RESTORE THE
RESULTS TEST
In 1982, Congress amended the Voting Rights Act, in part, as a
response to the Mobile decision. The Senate Report, prepared by the
Committee on the Judiciary, delineated the purpose of the amended
section 2. A review of the Report clearly indicates that Congress
intended to reject the intent standard and restore voting rights law to
the pre-Mobile decisions 3
The Senate Report set forth the purpose of the amendment to
section 2. The report stated that the amendment was designed to
make clear that proof of discriminatory intent is not required to
establish a violation of section 2. The purpose of the amendment
was to restore the legal standards that applied to vote dilution claims
districts, majority vote requirements, anti-single shot voting provisions and
the lack of provision for at- large candidates running for particular
geographical sub-districts. The fact of dilution is established upon proof of
the existence of an aggregate of these factors.

Id.30

Mobile, 446 U.S. at 66-67.

31 S. Rep. No. 417, 97th Cong., 2nd Sess., reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177
[hereinafterS. Rep.]. The Supreme Court in Thornburgv.Gingles, 478 U.S. 30,43
n.7 (1986), stated that the Senate Report was the authoritativeguide to the meaning

of the amended section 2.
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prior to the Mobile decision. The amendment also included a new
subsection to section 2 that delineated the legal standards under the
results test.32 According to the report, the issue to be decided under
the results test is whether the political processes are equally open to
minority voters.
The discussion concerning the amendment to section 2 provides
insight into the scope of the changes made in 1982 to the statute.
The report stated that proof of discriminatory purpose should not be a
prerequisite to establishing a violation of section 2. The amendment
permitted voting rights plaintiffs to prove a violation by showing that
minority voters were denied an equal chance to participate in the
33
political process.
In rejecting the intent standard, the Judiciary Committee
("Committee") made several key findings.
The Committee
concluded that requiring proof of a discriminatory purpose was
inconsistent with the original legislative intent and subsequent
legislative history of section 2. Second, the Mobile decision was a
radical departure from both Supreme Court and lower federal court
precedent in the voting rights field. Third, the intent test focuses on
the wrong question and places an unacceptable burden upon voting
rights plaintiffs. Fourth, the amendment was not an effort to overturn
the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Constitution, rather it was
designed to correct the misreading of section 2 by the Court?'
The Committee believed that the rejection of the intent test was
consistent with the original legislative understanding of section 2
when the Voting Rights Act was passed in 1965. The proponents of
the intent test contended that section 2 was designed to track the
Fifteenth Amendment and that the amendment required proof of a
discriminatory purpose. Since Congress chose to track the language
of the Fifteenth Amendment in the 1965 version of section 2, an
intent requirement was also present in the statute.
After examining the legislative history of the 1965 statute, the
relevant legislative history of the 1970 extension of the Act, and the
general understanding in 1965 of what was required to establish a
Fifteenth Amendment violation, the Committee rejected the
32

S. Rep., supran. 20, at 2.

3 S. Rep., supran.20, at 13.
S. Rep., supra n.20, at 13.
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arguments of the advocates of the intent standard. The Committee
noted that throughout the hearings and debates on the original
version of section 2, there was no statement by a proponent or
opponent of statute indicating that section 2 only reached purposeful
discrimination. Moreover, the legislative history of the 1970
extension of the Voting Rights Act confirmed that Congress had not
intended to limit the original section 2 to situations where
discriminatory intent was proved. 5
With respect to the constitutional context, the Committee observed
that Congress had to make a choice as to whether section 2 should be
coextensive with the Fifteenth Amendment or whether the statute
should be broader. In 1965 there was no need to choose between
these two alternatives. It was possible to regard section 2 as a
restatement of the Fifteenth Amendment, and as reaching vote
dilution regardless of whether intent was established. According to
the Committee, there was no general understanding in 1965, among
academics, practitioners and the lower federal courts that the
Fifteenth or Fourteenth Amendments always required proof of
discriminatory intent to establish a violation?5 From its review of the
case law, at the time of the enactment of section 2, the Committee
concluded that proof of intent was not always a prerequisite to a
liability finding. In some cases the Supreme Court focused its
analysis on discriminatory purposes or results.? In other cases, the
Court suggested that liability could be established under either test s
To ensure that the courts understood the intent of Congress when it
amended section 2, the Committee set out in great detail its
understanding of the operation of section 2 and the standards that
were to govern litigation under it. The Committee stated that "[t]he
amendment of section 2 is designed to make clear that plaintiffs need
not prove a discriminatorypurpose in the adoption or maintenance of
" S. Rep., supra n.20, at 14.
36 S.Rep., supra n. 20, at 15. The Committee noted that in 1965.
3

Prior to the passage of the Voting Rights Act, the Supreme Court had held that
a claim ofunconstitutionalvote dilution could be establishedby a showing of either
discriminatory results or discriminatory purpose. Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433
(1965); Bums v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73 (1966). See, eg., Palmer v. Thompson,
403 U.S. 219, 225 (1971) (finding that proof of discriminatory intent was not
determinative ofwhether there was a violation of the equal protection clause).
38 S.Rep., supran. 20, at 15.
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the challenged system or practice in order to establish a violation.""
A vote dilution plaintiff could choose to either prove an intentional
violation or demonstrate that the challenged system or practice,
under the totality of circumstances, resulted in the denial of equal
access to the political process. If a plaintiff chose to proceed under
the results standard, the court would be required to assess the impact
of the challenged system on the basis of objective factors, without
making any inquiry about the motivations that lay behind the
adoption or maintenance of the practice. The Committee clearly
stated that the "specific intent of this amendment is that the plaintiffs
may choose to establish discriminatory results without proving any
kind of discriminatory purpose."40

39

Id. at 21.

o S. Rep., supra at 22 (emphasis supplied). In order to give guidance to the lower
courts, the Committee set out several objective factors that were relevant to a vote
dilution claim under section 2:
1. The extent of any history of official discrimination in the state or political
subdivision that touched the right of the members of the minority group to
register, to vote, or otherwise to participate in the democratic process;
2. The extent to which voting in the elections of the state or political
subdivision is racially polarized;
3. The extent to which the state or political subdivision has used unusually
large election districts, majority vote requirements, anti-single shot
provisions, or other voting practices or procedures that may enhance the
opportunity for discrimination against the minority group;
4. If there is a candidate slating process, whether members of the minority
group have been denied access to that process;
5. The extent to which members of the minority group in the state or
political subdivision bear the effects of discrimination in such areas as
education, employment and health, which hinder their ability to participate
effectively in the political process;
6. Whether political campaigns have been characterized by overt or subtle
racial appeals;
7. The extent to which members of the minority group have been elected to
public office in the jurisdiction.
S. Rep., supra n. 20, at 22. These enumerated factors bear close resemblance to the
criteria developed by the Fifth Circuit in Zimmer. See note 19, supra. Other factors
that were deemed relevant to the inquiry where whether there had been a significant
lack of responsiveness to the particularized needs of the minority community and
whether the policy underlying the challenged practice was tenuous. The
Committee cautioned that there was no requirement that any particular number of
factors be proved or that a majority of them point one way or another. Id. at 22.
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In its Report, the Committee also addressed the rationale behind
the rejection of the intent test. The Committee believed that the test
asked the wrong question. Under the intent test, the focus of the
inquiry was not on how the challenged practice impacted the ability
of minority voters to participate in the political process; rather, the
focus was solely on the motivations of officials, who may have
established the practice in the distant past. Under the intent test, so
long as the motive for creating a multimember district was not
racially discriminatory, the system could not be changed under
section 2, regardless of its impact on minority voters in the present.
The Committee believed that if minority voters are denied a fair
opportunity to participate, the system should be changed, without
requiring proof of why the system was created or maintained!'
An additional rationale for the rejection of the intent test by the
Committee was that it was divisive. In order to satisfy the test,
plaintiffs had to brand entire communities or officials as racists.
Litigants were required to explore the motivations of individual
elected officials and other citizens to determine whether their
decisions were motivated by invidious racial considerations.
According to the Committee should inquiries threatened to destroy
any existing racial progress in a community 2
Another reason for eliminating proof of intent from the plaintiff's
case was the difficulty in establishing racial motivation. In the cases
where the challenged practice was adopted in the past, there may be
no evidence regarding intent since legislators may have died and the
legislative records regarding the adoption of the challenged system
may no longer be in existence. In fact, most smaller cities and
counties would not have maintained the kind of official records
needed to establish the motivation of the legislature 3 In cases
involving recent enactments, the courts may rule that legislative
immunity barred plaintiffs from inquiring into the motives of
individual legislators. Moreover, the Committee noted the difficulty
in proving the motives of the majority of the electorate when an

41

S. Rep., stpraat28.

42 S.
43

Rep., supran.20, at 28.

1d
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election law was adopted or maintained as the result of a
referendum."
The Committee was also concerned that reliance on the intent test
afforded an opportunity for defendants to "muddy the waters." The
Committee feared that defendants would offer non-racial
rationalizations for a law, which in fact purposely discriminates. This
defect could not be eliminated even in cases where plaintiffs could
establish intent by reliance on a wide variety of circumstantial and
indirect evidence, because the defendants could attempt to rebut this
proof by planting a false trail of direct evidence eschewing racial
motive, and advancing other governmental objectives.
The
Committee concluded that "[s]o long as the court must make a
separate ultimate finding of intent, after accepting the proof of the
factors involved in the White analysis, that danger remains and
seriously clouds the prospects of eradicating the remaining instances
of racial discrimination in American elections.""'
It should be clear from this review of the Senate Report that
Congress intended to reject the intent test as a necessary element of a
vote dilution claim under section 2. The goal of the amendment was
to restore the law to the pre-Mobile doctrine of White and its
progeny. Under these cases, a plaintiff had to establish, using
objective factors, that the political process or challenged system
resulted in denying minority voters an equal opportunity to
participate in the process and elect their candidates of choice. In
essence, under the totality of circumstances test, employed preMobile, a plaintiff had to paint a picture of the political realities in a
jurisdiction and demonstrate that minorities had less access to the
process than white voters. This was not an easy test and required a
wide and far-reaching inquiry into the political life of a polity and the
impact of the challenged system on minority voters.
Throughout the Report there are repeated references to why that
test was inadequate in the vote rights field. One of the main reasons
was that it was almost impossible, in many instances, to find
motivation evidence in cases that involved electoral practices that
were of ancient vintage. Another concern was that in cases of recent
vintage, clever defendants could offer pretextual non-racial
44id
45 Id.at29.
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explanations for the adoption or maintenance of an electoral system
and blunt a plaintiff's efforts to establish intent through
circumstantial proof. Congress was concerned that to permit
defendants to rebut a plaintiff's evidence by offering
nondiscriminatory rationales could limit the ability of section 2 to
eradicate racial discrimination.
Moreover, at no point in the Report does the Committee suggest
that the amendment was designed to address solely the factual
context of the Mobile case. Mobile was a challenge to the adoption
and maintenance by elected officials of an at-large election system.
However, the Committee did not limit the rejection of the intent test
to cases involving only legislative enactments; thereby allowing
other types of intent proof to remain a part of a plaintiff's burden. In
fact, there were numerous references in the Report that intent proof
of any kind was to be banished from the analysis.
Accordingly, under the new section 2, plaintiffs did not have to
offer any intent evidence to establish a voting rights claim. The
plaintiff could offer such proof or proceed completely under the
results test. Under a fair reading of the Report, if a plaintiff chose to
proceed under the objective test, a defendant could not rebut that
proof by showing the absence of racially discriminatory intent in the
adoption, maintenance or operation of the challenged system. This
conclusion flows from the cautionary note sounded by the
Committee in its discussion of how defendants, under the old intent
test, could offer nonracial explanations to defeat a circumstantial
dilution claim, where a court made an inferential finding of intent
from the indirect evidence. If the Committee were critical of the use
of nonracial rationales under the old intent standard, it would follow
that such proof should have no role in the results test.
L.

THORNBURG V. G1NGLES:46 A NEW FRAMEWORK
EMERGES.

In Gingles, the Court, in several opinions, grappled with the
method of proving a vote dilution challenge to an at-large election
system and whether intent was still an element of proof in voting
rights case!' The majority of the Court agreed with Justice
46 Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
47 Id. at 34-35.
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Brennan's conclusion, regarding the framework he established for
proving a section 2 case. However, with respect to the issue of intent,
the Court was sharply divided.
Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, stated that the essence of
a section 2 claim was that an election law, practice or structure, in
conjunction with social and historical conditions, resulted in the
diminution of the ability of minority voters to elect their preferred
candidates.4 8 However, the Court cautioned, that minority group
members who challenge such systems must prove that the use of the
challenged structure operates to minimize the ability of the group to
elect their preferred candidates.49
In order to prevail on a claim that the use of a multimember or atlarge election system dilutes minority voting strength, the Court
stated that the following circumstances must be found by the district
court. The minority group must be able to demonstrate that it is
sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a singlemember districtV ° Additionally, the minority group must be able to
show that it is politically cohesive.5' Finally, the group must
establish that the white majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable
it to defeat minority candidates. 2 By demonstrating the existence of

4aId

at47.

49 Gingles, 478

U.S. 48.
oId. at 50. Unless the minority group has the potential to elect representatives in
the absence of the challenged structure, there can be no dilution. The singlemember district is the appropriate standard against which to measure the potential
of the minority group to elect candidates of its choice because it is the smallest
political unit from which representatives are elected. Id.n. 17. If the minority
group is dispersed throughout an at-large district or county or is so numerically
small that it could not constitute a majority in a single-member district, the group
cannot maintain that they can elect representatives of their choice in the absence of
the challenged structure because a smaller political sub-district or unit could not be
created consistent with the Constitution's one-person one-vote standard.
5 478 U.S. at 51.
52 Id at 51. Prior

to the 1982 amendments, in the context of a challenge to a
multimember or at-large electoral structure, the courts held that in the absence of
significant white bloc voting, it could not be contended that the ability of minority
group members to elect their chosen representatives was inferior to white voters or
that the at-large structure impeded the ability of minorities to win at the polls. See,
e.g., McMillan V. Escambia County, Fla., 748 F.2d 1037, 1043 (5th Cir. 1984);
United States v. Marengo County Comm'n, 731 F.2d 1546, 1566 (11th Cir.), appeal
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these factors, the minority group can establish that submergence in a
white multi-member district impedes its ability to elect its chosen
representatives.
After consideration of the Gingles preconditions, the lower court
was required to examine the totality of the circumstances and
determine, based upon "a searching practical evaluation of the past
and present political reality," whether the political processes were
equally open to minority voters 3 The majority instructed that this
determination requires an intensely local appraisal of the design and
impact of the contested electoral systemY4
While the majority of the Court agreed with Justice Brennan's
framework for proving a section 2 case, they divided over the
question of whether causation was relevant to the section 2 inquiry. 5'
Justice Brennan rejected any notion that intent proof had any role in a
challenge under section 2. He believed that the language of section 2
and the Senate Report made clear that the critical question in a
section 2 claim was whether the use of a system or practice resulted
in members of a minority group having less opportunity than whites
to participate in the political process.O Justice Brennan opined that it
was the difference between the choices made by blacks and whites,
not the reasons for that difference, that resulted in blacks having less
opportunity than whites to elect their preferred candidates.57
Accordingly, in considering proof of racially polarized voting,
Justice Brennan was concerned with the correlation between the race
of the voter and the selection of certain candidates, not the causes of
the correlation.5 8
dism'dand cert. deniea 469 U.S. 951 (1984); Nevitt v. Sides, 571 F.2d 209, 223

(5th Cir. 1978), cert denie4 446 U.S. 951 (1980).
5

Gingles, 478 U.S. at 45.

4Id.at 79.

1 Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens agreed with the opinion of Justice
Brennan that intent was irrelevant in a section 2 claim. 478 U.S. at 33. Justice
O'Connor's opinion regarding the role of intent in the section 2 inquiry was joined
by56Chief Justice Burger, and Justices Powell and Rehnquist. Id
Gingles, 478 U.S. 48 n.15.
57
Id. at 63-64.
58
1d.at 64. Justice Brennan was concerned, at this point in the opinion, with how
a plaintiffproved the third Ginglesprecondition: Whether the white majority votes
consistently as a bloc to enable it to defeat minority candidates. This issue is also
termed legally significant racial bloc voting. The defendants in Gingles contended
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Justice Brennan also rejected the notion that plaintiffs were
required to prove that white voters voted against black candidates
because of racial animosity. He believed that this argument must be
rejected for the same reasons that Congress repudiated the intent test
Mobile with respect to legislative bodies. The intent test was
unnecessarily divisive and involved charges of racism on the part of
individual officials or entire communities. Under the old intent test,
a plaintiff was required to prove that some elected officials were
racists. Under the new intent test, a plaintiff would have to prove that
most of the white community was racist in order to obtain judicial
relief. As Justice Brennan concluded, "[]t is difficult to imagine a
more racially divisive requirement."5 9
Finally, Justice Brennan rejected the new intent test because, as the
Senate Report concluded regarding the old intent test, it asked the
wrong question. According to Justice Brennan, all that mattered
under section 2 was voter behavior and not its explanations.' He
feared that requiring proof that racial considerations actually caused
voter behavior would result - contrary to congressional intent - in
cases where a black minority that functionally has been totally
excluded from the political process will be unable to establish a
section 2 violation.1
Justice O'Connor, while agreeing with the framework established
by the majority for proving a section 2 claim, disagreed with Justice
Brennan's complete rejection of intent evidence.' She stated that if
"statistical evidence of divergent racial voting patterns is admitted
that in establishing this issue a plaintiff should not be permitted to rely solely on
bivariate statistical analyses that correlated the race of the voter and the level of

voter support for certain candidates. Such statistical evidence, according to the
defendants, could not establish that race was the primary determinant of voters'

choices. Essentially, the defendants were arguing for a new intent test, where the
motivation of voters would have to be taken into account before racially polarized
voting could be established. They argued for use of a multivariate approach that
would take into consideration a variety of issues, such as party affiliation, age,
religion, income, incumbency, education, and campaign expenditures. 478 U.S. 61-

62. Justice Brennan completely rejected this methodology, and concluded that "the
legal concept of racially polarized voting incorporates neither causation nor intent."
Id.
59 Id. at 72.

60Id.
61

62

Gingles, 478 U.S. at 73.
Id. at 84 (O'Conner, J., concurring in judgment).
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solely to establish that the minority group is politically cohesive and
to assess its prospects for electoral success... [a] defendan[t] can not
rebut such proof by showing that the divergent racial voting patterns
can be explained, in part, by causes other than race."
However, Justice O'Connor refused to banish intent evidence from
the overall vote dilution inquiry. She contended that evidence that a
candidate preferred by minority voters was rejected by white voters
for reasons other than those that made the candidate the preferred
choice of minority voters may be relevant in determining whether
white voters will vote consistently to defeat minority candidates. '
According to her analysis, such proof would suggest that another
equally preferred minority candidates might be able to attract greater
white support in the future.6
Justice O'Connor also believed that Congress intended that
explanations for white voter behavior should be considered by the
courts in the responsiveness context.'
She opined that in
communities riven by racial hostility, such considerations would
make it more likely that officials elected without significant minority
support would consider minority group interests.67 Justice O'Connor
concluded that in deciding a vote dilution claim all evidence
concerning voting preferences should not be considered.s
While the opinions of Justices O'Connor and Brennan with respect
to the issue of intent appear to be irreconcilable, there are some
points where they converge. Justice O'Connor agreed that Congress
rejected the intent test of Mobile. 9 She agreed that the results test
was chosen by Congress as the standard for a section 2 violation.
Justice O'Connor also recognized that a plaintiff could choose to
establish discriminatory results without proving any kind of
discriminatory purpose 0 However, unlike Justice Brennan, she was
unwilling to banish completely intent evidence from the vote dilution
inquiry. She believed that such evidence could be helpful to the
63 Id.at 100.
4id.
5id.
66

Gingles,478 U.S. at 100-01.

67id.

6"id.
69 Id. at 98.
70

Id. at 99.
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lower courts in determining whether the political processes were
equally accessible to all players.7 Accordingly, while declining to
establish intent as an element of a plaintiffs case in chief, she was
willing to allow such evidence into the record for the courts to
consider in determining the ultimate question.'
The problem with permitting the defendants to offer nonracial
explanations for divergent voting patterns is that ultimately the
burden of disproving these rationales falls back onto the shoulders of
the plaintiffs. How is a plaintiff to rebut a showing that white voters
are not racists because they have, occasionally, supported a "safe"
black candidate who has been slated by the majority party? Will a
plaintiff be called upon to commission a political survey of voters or
a poll to assess the racial views of current voters? What about cases
where the elections were held ten or twenty years ago? How is the
plaintiff to meet the evidence that some white voters were not
motivated by racial considerations? These thorny issues led Congress
to reject intent evidence as posing an insurmountable burden on
plaintiffs and requiring entire communities to be branded as racists.
Congress and Justice Brennan got it right; requiring intent as an
element of a section 2 claim is fraught with difficulty. While
understanding Justice O'Connor's reluctance to ban causation
evidence from the totality of the circumstance test, by permitting
defendants to raise the intent shield, cases where minorities have
been shut out of the political process may go unremedied. It was that
very evil that led Congress to reject the intent test.
IV.

THE REEMERGENCE OF TIE INTENT TEST.

Following the decision in Gingles the circuit courts have struggled
to navigate between Justice Brennan's view that intent had no role in
the determination of a section 2 case and Justice O'Connor's view
that it could be relevant to the overall inquiry under the totality of the
circumstances. The courts that have considered this question have
essentially adopted Justice O'Connor's position and have concluded
that plaintiffs must prove intent, although it can be demonstrated
inferentially.
71 Id.
72

Id. at 100.
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A. League of United Latin American Citizens v. Clements

(LULA)

73

In LULAC, the Fifth Circuit explored the question of whether
intent proof was required in a section 2 challenge to the at-large
election of state supreme court judges.74 The district court held that
in proving the third Gingles precondition (legally significant racial
bloc voting) plaintiffs need only demonstrate that white and black
voters generally supported different candidates.' Accordingly, the
district court excluded evidence that tended to show that the
divergent voting patters were attributable to factors other than race.76
On appeal, the defendants contended that the district court committed
error by refusing to consider the nonracial causes for voter
preferences.'
The Fifth Circuit en banc noted that the scope of the Voting Rights
Act was broad, but concluded that section 2's protections extended
only to defeats experienced by voters "on account of race or color."73
The court stated that "without an inquiry into the circumstances
underlying unfavorable election returns," the lower courts would not
be in a position to determine whether the losses experienced by
minority voters were mere losses at the polls or the result of
discrimination. According to the LULAC court, the inquiry into the
999 F.2d 831 (5th Cir. 1993)(en banc).
Id.at 837-38.
7s Id. at 837.
76
1d at 850.
77 Id. at 842.
78 Id at 850. The Senate Report discussed the use of the term "on account of
color", and concluded as follows:
During the committee deliberations, opponents of the results test argued that
the reported bill is inconsistent with the results standard because section 2,
as amended, still contains the phrase 'a denial or abridgement (of the right
to vote) on account of race or color.' The argument is that the words 'on
account of' themselves create a requirement of purposeful
discrimination.... Congress has used the words 'on account of race or
color' in the act to mean 'with respect to' race or color, and not to connote
any required purpose of racial discrimination. Any other arguments based
on similar parsing of isolated words in the bill that there is some implied
'purpose' component in section 2... are equally misplaced and incorrect.
S. Rep., supranote 20, at 192, n. 109.
79
LULAC, 999 F.2d at 850.
73

74

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2000

19

Touro Law Review, Vol. 16, No. 3 [2000], Art. 16

962

TOURO LAW REVIEW

[Vol 16

reasons for, or causes of, electoral losses must be undertaken in order
to determine whether they were the product of partisan politics or
racial vote dilution.10
The LULAC court discussed the conflict between Justice Brennan
and Justice O'Connor on this issue." According to the Fifth Circuit
five justices rejected Justice Brennan's approach, and, therefore, the
opinions by Justices O'Connor and Justice White represented a
majority of the Court and should be adhered to and not Justice
Brennan's opinion on the issue of intent." Relying primarily on
Justice O'Connor's opinion, the LULAC court decided that evidence
seeking to explain the divergence of voting patterns between blacks
and whites could not be excluded from the overall vote dilution
3
inquiry.8
While it adopted Justice O'Connor's approach, the Fifth Circuit
did not hold that plaintiffs must supply conclusive proof that a
minority group's failure to elect representatives of its choice is
caused by racial animus in the white electorate.' The court believed
that such a requirement could be inferred from the text of the
amended section 2, the case law pre-Mobile, and the Senate Report.85
In this regard, the court considered whether the plaintiffs had to
prove affirmatively the existence of racial bias among the white
electorate or merely negate the defendants' proof that partisan
politics best explained the divergent voting patterns. 6 The court
noted that requiring plaintiffs to establish that white voters were
motivated by racial animus when they rejected minority preferred
candidates would make the racial bloc voting inquiry difficult and
expensive to establish:' The court held that whether or not the

10 Id.at 853.
81 See Gingles, 478 U.S. at 83. Justice White also disagreed with Justice
Brennan's views on this issue and filed a concurring opinion. Id. Justice White
was of the opinion that where partisan affiliation and not race explained the
divergence in voting patterns, a violation of section 2 may not be established. Id
12 LULAC, 999 F.2d. at 855.
83 d. at 856.
s"Id. at 859.
85 Id.
8
6 id.

7Id. at 860.
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burden of the plaintiffto prove racial bloc voting includes the burden
to explain partisan influence, the result is the same.13
The LULAC court did not require plaintiffs to prove intent, in their
case in chief, but following Justice O'Connor's approach, refused to
banish from the racial bloc voting inquiry defendants' proof
concerning partisanship. Essentially, the court adopted the view that
the determination of a section 2 challenge must rest on a searching
and thorough inquiry into the underlying circumstances of the
election results offered by plaintiffs to demonstrate racial bloc voting
and the causes of the divergence in voting patterns between white
and black voters. While acknowledging that the additional inquiry
required could be burdensome and costly, the court declined to
follow the approach of the district court and exclude such evidence.
Without giving guidance to the lower courts as to how a plaintiff
rebuts the partisanship evidence, the LULAC court unsettled
Congress' effort to codify the results standard. Despite Congress'
best efforts to elucidate the meaning of the amendments to section 2,
the Fifth Circuit adhered to the view that the words "on account of
race or color" meant that, despite the Senate Report's rejection of the
intent test, plaintiffs had to prove some form of purposeful
discrimination.
B. Nipper v. Smith9
In Nipper, African-Americanvoters and an association of AfricanAmerican attorneys challenged the at-large election of state court
judges in Florida? One of the issues confronted by the Eleventh
Circuit was whether plaintiffs, in order to prevail on their section 2
claim, had to prove the existence of racial animus among the white
electorate
Unlike the court in LULAC, the Nipper court
affirmatively concluded that under the amended section 2, plaintiffs
had to prove purposeful discrimination.' The Eleventh Circuit also
gave guidance to the lower courts as to how a plaintiff meets that
burden. After a review of the legislative history and pre-Mobile
88 Ra at 860.

89 39 F.3d 1494 (1 th Cir.1994) (en banc).
90Id. at 1496-97.
9' Id. at

1520.

92M. at 1515.
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precedents, the court ruled that racial animus could be established
inferentially.93
With respect to the threshold question, the Nipper court held that
section 2 prohibits voting practices that have the effect of allowing a
community motivated by racial prejudice to exclude a minority
group from participation in the political process. 4 Accordingly, if,
under the totality of circumstances, there is insufficient evidence of
racial bias operating in the community then a claim of vote dilution
can not be established. 5
The circuit court rejected the plaintiffs argument that section 2
required only proof of disparate election results. The court relied on
the language in the statute that limited its reach to cases where the
deprivation of the franchise was "on account of race or color."'
According to the court, Congress intended, by the use of that
language, to retain racial bias as the gravamen of a vote dilution
claimn. 97
Thus, some form of racial discrimination must be
established in order to afford plaintiffs judicial relief.98
According to the court, the legislative history of the amended
section 2 supported the conclusion that racial bias was the
cornerstone of a vote dilution claim. The court observed that the
intent of Congress in amending section 2 was to restore the "results"
test of White and Whitcomb."° Under those cases, a plaintiff had to
establish proof of invidious discrimination as an essential element of
a Fourteenth Amendment voting rights claim.' ' A plaintiff could
establish that element by either proving that legislative officials
intended to enact or maintain a discriminatory voting system or by
proving the existence of objective factors (so-called Zimmer factors,
subsequently incorporated in the amended statute as Senate factors)
indicating that the minority group had less opportunity to participate

9'
Id. at
94

1526.

Id. at 1534.
91Nipper, 39 F.3d at 1514.
96
Id.at 1515.
97 Id.

98 Id.

99Id.
'00 Nipper, 39 F.3d at 1517 (noting Congress' "stated purpose to return the

Section 2 burden of proof to pre-Bolden standards").
101

Id at 1519.
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The
in the political process and to elect candidates of its choice."
Supreme Court in Mobile eliminated the latter approach and required
proof of discriminatory intent 10
The Nipper court concluded that Congress' intent was to overturn
the Mobile intent standard and restore the White method of proving
vote dilution. According to the court, Congress intended to eliminate
solely the requirement that racial bias on the part of legislators or
other officials was an essential ingredient of a vote dilution claim."Y
Their intent was not to banish consideration of racial bias from the
inquiry. Thus, under the amended section 2, a plaintiff could choose
to either establish discriminatory motive of the legislators or
demonstrate, through proof of the Senate factors, that the electoral
system interacts with racial bias in the community and allows that
bias to dilute minority voting strength.
In reaching the conclusion that intent was an essential element of a
plaintiff's case under section 2, the court rejected the Department of
Justice's position, as amicus curiae, that section 2 required no proof
whatsoever of intentional discrimination.10 In support of its position,
the Department of Justice relied on the Judiciary Committee's Report
wherein it was stated that "the specific intent of [the] amendment is
that the plaintiffs may choose to establish discriminatory results
without proving any kind of discriminatory purpose."''' The court
stated that statements in the Report about avoiding the intent standard
must be considered in light of the goal of Congress to overturn the
Mobile legislative intent requirement.0 7 According to the court, "the
many references to intent, motivation and purpose throughout the
Report... must be read to infer to the intent of those responsible for
The court
erecting or maintaining the challenged scheme."'0
concluded that the legislative history did not reveal any intent on the

102 id.

v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 66 (1980) (finding that "a plaintiffmust prove
that the disputed plan was conceived or operated as [a] purposeful devic[e] to
103 Mobile

further racial... discrimination").
'"4Nipper,39 F.3d at 1520.
105 Id.

" S. Rep., supra n. 20, at 28, emphasis supplied.
F.3d at 1520.
5
' 1d.
at 1522.
0
1 7 Nipper, 39
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part of Congress to limit section 2 inquiry to a purely statistical test,
without any consideration of racial bias.'19
Having concluded that racial bias remained an essential element of
a plaintiffs challenge to electoral practices under section 2, the court
focussed on operationalizing its decision. The court opined that
"proof of the second and third Gingles preconditions [minority
political cohesion and white bloc voting against minority preferred
candidates] is circumstantial evidence of racial bias operating
through the electoral system to deny minority voters equal access to
the political process."" 0 Accordingly, the court held that the
existence of those factors, and a feasible remedy, generally would be
sufficient to warrantjudicial relief."'
The defendant can rebut a plaintiffs [circumstantial showing of
discriminatory motive], by demonstrating the absence of racial bias
in the voting community." 2 One approach available to a defendant
would be to demonstrate that the divergent voting patterns could best
be explained by other, non-racial circumstances."' If the defendant
offers such proof, the district court must make a searching inquiry
into the past and present reality, under the totality of circumstances
test, to determine whether minority voters have been denied equal
access to the political process on account of race or color."" The
court stated that under this burden shifting approach, plaintiffs were
not required to proof a negative. Instead, plaintiffs could establish
that racial bias was operating in the community by demonstrating
through a statistical analysis that there were divergent voting patterns
among white and black voters."5
Finally, the court observed that vote dilution cases were
circumstantial evidence cases. "6 It acknowledged that rarely will
there be direct proof that resolves the contested issues. Rather,
Congress intended, and Gingles confirmed, that the objective factors
listed in the Report would be used by districts courts in making a
'09id. at 1521-23.
" Id. at 1524.

"IId.
id.

112id.
113
114 Id.

15Nipper,39 F.3d at 1525.

116Id.

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol16/iss3/16

24

Scott-McLaughlin: Voting Rights Act

2000

VOTING RIGHTS ACT

particularized determination as to whether, in the aggregate, there
was sufficient evidence pointing to dilution." 7 Therefore, when
confronted with a defendant's rebuttal evidence, the district court
must search the record to determine under the totality test whether
the challenged system has operated to deny minority voters an equal
opportunity to participate in the political process.""
The Nipper court was the first circuit court to resurrect the intent
test from the ashes. Despite Congress' best efforts to consign the
intent test to the dustbin of history, the Eleventh Circuit chose to
parse the language of the Report to support its conclusion that some
form of intent was still required. However, a thorough review of the
Report belies that approach. Nowhere in the Report is there any
support for the subtle distinctions that the Eleventh Circuit found
regarding intent of legislators as opposed to the intent of the voters.
Essentially, the court acknowledged that intent of the legislators was
not required, but opined that intent of the voters was required to be
established by a plaintiff to make out a violation of the amended
section 2." While one can understand the desire to harmonize the
amended statute with the pre-Mobile decisions in White and
Whitcomb, there is little support for the proposition that Congress
intended to eliminate only part of the intent test. As Justice Brenan
noted in Gingles,this new and improved intent test was as pernicious
as the old Mobile test.
This conclusion is supported by the Nipper court's assignment to
the plaintiff the burden of rebutting a defendant's non-racial
explanations for divergent voting patterns. While the court permitted
the intent element to be demonstrated inferentially through statistical
proof, the court gave no guidance as to how a plaintiff rebuts direct
evidence of a defendant that racial bias was not operating in the
community. Clearly, once such rebuttal evidence is received a
plaintiff can not rely on the intent inference, but must go beyond the
statistical proof and, presumably, offer direct evidence of racial bias
or undercut the defendant's evidence by attacking the credibility of
the witnesses or the methodology of defense experts. This inquiry
unduly complicates a section 2 case and gives almost no guidance to
the district courts as to how they are to weigh and balance these
1 17

Id.

"8 Id.at 1526.
119 Id.
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competing inferences. The concern is that a defendant may escape a
liability finding by offering "non-racial" explanations that mask
racial considerations; thereby blunting the efficacy of section 2.
C. Vecinos De Barrio Uno v. City ofHolyoke2 °
In Uno, the First Circuit addressed the issue of what role, if any,
intent evidence played in the vote dilution inquiry under section 2.1
Essentially, the First Circuit followed the lead of the Eleventh Circuit
and held that such proof was relevant to a challenge to an at-large
election scheme." The Uno court also cautioned that permitting
such an inquiry raised concerns that defendants could escape a
liability finding by offering "non-racial" rationales for divergent
voting patterns.
The court began its discussion of section 2 by noting that the
Gingles preconditions were the foundation for a vote dilution
claim. "
Plaintiffs have to show that the minority group is
sufficiently large and compact to constitute a majority in a singlemember district. Second, plaintiffs must demonstrate that the
minority group is politically cohesive, and that there is significant
bloc voting by non-minorities against the community's preferred
candidates. According to the court, "proof of all three preconditions
creates an inference that members of the minority [group have been]
harmed" by the challenged structure or procedure.'24 The court
cautioned that the vote dilution inference is not irrebuttable. The
inference of vote dilution can be rebutted by other evidence.
Accordingly, the court instructed that a district court should be
careful not to "wear blinders."'" The trial court must "sift the
evidence produced at trial and gather enough information to paint a
picture of the attendant facts and circumstances."'2 6 After all the
evidence is received, the trial court must feel the political fabric for
texture and nuance, in order to determine whether the minority group
120 72 F.3d 973
121 Id. at 977.

(1st Cir. 1995).

'Id. at 981.
'22 Id. at 979-80.
124

Id. at 980.

125 Id.

126 id.
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has been denied equal access to the political process. In this regard,
the Uno court concluded that completing the inquiry demands
comprehensive, not limited, canvassing of the pertinent facts.'2
After establishing the framework for a challenge to an at-large
system under section 2, the Uno court grappled with the controversy
concerning the intent question. The court acknowledged that the
Supreme Court in Gingles split on this question and that the
controversy has raged since then in the circuit courts.'" The court
considered this an issue of relevance. "The court believed that the
presence or absence of bias is arguably relevant to the question of
whether a minority group lacks equal" electoral access.'2 The court
observed that in a community divided along racial lines, the
prospects for electoral success differed markedly from its prospects
in a more cohesive community. 3 Additionally, sentiments unrelated
to race could also affect election results. The court concluded that
when it can be demonstrated that voters in a particular community
are motivated primarily by non-racial causes, it was reasonable to
assume that a minority-preferred candidate who embodied these
values might equally be able to engender support among a majority
of the white voters."'
"The Uno court concluded that when racial antagonism is not the
cause of an electoral defeat suffered by a [minority-preferred]
candidate, the defeat does not prove a lack of electoral opportunity"
that section 2 was designed to remedy.' Such political defeats may
be attributable to the candidate's failure to support popular
programmative initiatives, or the candidate's failure to reflect the
majority's ideological viewpoints (partisanship), or the popularity of
Where such considerations caused the defeat of a
an incumbent'
minority candidate, section 2 does not provide relief. Following this
analysis to its logical conclusion, the court held that plaintiffs cannot
prevail on a section 2 claim, if there is significantly probative

127

Uno, 72 F3d at 979-80.

121
Id.at 980 (citing Nipper,and LULAC).
129 Id.at 981.
130

id.

131 Id.

132 id.
133id.
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evidence that whites voted as a bloc for reasons wholly unrelated to
racial animus. 34
The First Circuit argued that its conclusion drew support from the
Without any
legislative history of the amended section 2.
independent review of the Senate Report or other documents
illustrative of congressional intent, the court concluded that the use
of the words "on account of race or color" meant that intent was still
an issue.'35 Without quoting a single sentence from the Senate
Report or the legislative debates, the court determined that when
Congress discarded the intent test, it meant only to eliminate from the
microscope evidence regarding the intent of the legislators in
enacting or maintaining the challenged system.'36
In reaching this conclusion the Court ignored the clear
pronouncement in the Senate Report that under the amended section
2 a plaintiff did not have to prove intent of any kind.'" Moreover, a
thorough review of that report fails to disclose any intention of
Congress that some form of the intent standard was alive and well
after the amendment. Additionally, the words "on account of race or
color" were not intended to require proof of a causation factor, and
the Judiciary Committee so stated.' Congress could not have been
more clear when it rejected the intent standard.'3 9 Despite Congress'
valiant attempt to correct the Supreme Court's misreading of the
original section 2, the Uno court, like the LULAC and Nipper courts
refused to adhere to congressional intent.
Despite raising the bar for a voting rights plaintiff, the Uno court
acknowledged that permitting inquiry into the causes of white bloc
Uno, 72 F.3d at 981.
at 982-83.
13 6 id. at 982.
'3

'..Id.

' S. Rep., supra n. 20, at 13 ("In our view, proof of discriminatory purpose
should not be a prerequisite to establishing a violation of section 2.); Id. at 22 ("The
specific intent of this amendment is that the plaintiffs may choose to establish
discriminatory results without proving any kind of discriminatory purpose.").
138 S.Rep., supra n.20, at 192, n.109. ("[I]t is patently clear that Congress has
used the words 'on account of race or color' in the Act to mean 'with respect to'
race or color, and not to connote any required purpose of racial discrimination.
Any... arguments ... that there is some implied 'purpose' component in section 2,
even when plaintiffs proceed under the results standard, are equally misplaced and
incorrect.').
139 See supra,note 40.
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voting couldjeopardize the effectiveness of section 2."' In response,
the First Circuit complained that skeptics misunderstood the nature
of the showing needed to support a section 2 claim.' According to
the Court, proof of the second and third Gingles preconditions
(minority political cohesion and white bloc voting) demonstrates that
racial cleavages in voting patterns existed, and that these differences
"were deep enough to defeat minority preferred candidates time and
again."'4 Proof of these two preconditions, gives rise to a strong
"inference that racial bias is operating through the medium [of the
challenged structure] to impair minority political [success]."'43
The dilution inference remains unless the defendant adduces
evidence tending to prove that the divergent voting patterns can most
logically be explained by factors unconnected to the intersection of
race with the challenged structure or practice. Such factors could
include organizational disarray, lack of funds, want of campaign
experience, the unattractiveness of particular candidates, or the
universal popularity of an opponent.'" However, the court cautioned
that even when such proof is forthcoming the defendant does not
automatically triumph. Before rejecting a section 2 challenge, "the
court must determine whether, [under] the totality of circumstances
test (including the original dilution inference and its factual
predicate), the minority group was denied meaningful access to the
political process on account of race [or color].' 4 5
The court stated that this framework imposed a "high hurdle" for
defendants who seek to defend against statistical evidence of
divergent voting patterns." The court emphasized that plaintiffs are
not required to disprove every possible explanation for racially
polarized voting in order to establish vote dilution.4 7 Plaintiffs have
to demonstrate that the three preconditions (alone or in combination
with the totality of circumstances) are strong enough that,
notwithstanding the countervailing evidence of other causative

'4
141

Uno, 72 F.3d at 982.
id.

142
143

4

id.

Uno, 72 F.3d at 983. n. 4.

' 45 Id. at 983.
146 Id.
147 id
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factors offered by the defendants, the record sustains a claim that
racial politics have resulted in diminished electoral opportunities for
48
minority voters.
The First Circuit held plaintiffs to a strict standard and gave
comfort to the defendants seeking to defend at-large elections. By
allowing a multifactored, multivariable analysis, the Court
introduced uncertainty into the voting rights field and beclouded the
vitality of section 2. Under this new and improved intent test, faced
with statistical showings of divergent voting patterns, defendants can
offer a host of expert opinions as to why the voting patterns were so
segregated. A defendant will argue that white voters rejected a
particular candidate because he did not share their concerns about
increasing crime or taxes. Some defendants will argue that the
candidate was not well known, had a poor campaign or lacked
money and that these factors resulted in her defeat. This velcro
approach to litigation belittles the serious threat to democracy that
disenfranchisementrepresents. As the Uno court recognized, "In this
enlightened day and age, bigots rarely advertise an intention to
engage in race-conscious politics."'4 9 The concerns is that by
allowing defendants to posit any number of explanations for
divergent voting patterns, election systems that have shut out
minority voters will go unremedied because a district chose to credit
a defendant's explanations over a plaintiff's statistical showing.
Without guiding the district court's assessment of the evidence, the
Uno court's burden allocation jeopardizes the goals of the Voting
50
Rights Act.'

,48 Id.
49

1

Id. at 984 (noting that "[njot surprisingly... racially polarized voting tends to

be a silent, shadowy thief of the minority's rights").
151 In the Senate Report the Judiciary Committee reviewed the purpose of the Act:
Seventeen years ago, Americans of all races and creeds joined to persuade

the nation to confront its conscience and fulfill the guarantee of the
constitution. From that effort came the Voting Rights Act of 1965.
President Lyndon Johnson hailed its enactments as a 'triumph for freedom
as huge as any ever won by any battlefield.' The Act has attacked the
shameful blight of voting discrimination.
S.Rep., supra n. 20, at 4.
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OF THE TOWN OF

IEMPSTEAD1 1
In Goosby, the Second Circuit confronted the issues addressed in
Nipper and Uno, i.e. whether intent was an element to be considered
in a section 2 case."2 In this case, the defendants contended that
partisanship politics best explained the divergent voting patterns in
the Town of Hempstead's Town Board elections.' They urged that
the statistical proof demonstrating the correlation between partisan
affiliation of the voters and the votes cast for particular candidates
precluded a finding of legally significant racial bloc voting (third
Gingles precondition)." The district court rejected that approach
and instead weighed defendants proof at the totality stage.' 55 The
circuit court agreed with the district judge's methodology and
affirmed his conclusion that partisanship did not best explain the
divergence in the vote. 5 Judge Pierre Leval concurred in the result
and wrote separately to express his views regarding the role of intent
evidence in a section 2 case 57
In Goosby, the defendants argued that the divergent voting patterns
evident in the Town elections resulted from the political choice of the
vast majority of white voters to register in and vote for the

180 F.3d476 (2nd. Cir. 1999).
'

52

d. at 482.

153 Id. (arguing that "Republican Party affiliation was determinant of electoral
success in Town-wide elections, the voting block that plaintiff had demonstrated

was along partisan, not racial, lines").
154 id.

155
In rejecting the defendant's

argument the district court stated:

In evaluating all of the relevant facts as a whole, including the size of the

Town, the absence of geographic sub-districts, the lack of access by blacks
to the Republican Party slating process, the unfortunate use of racial appeals

in political campaigns, the lack of responsiveness by the Town Board to the
particularized needs of the black communities, and the stated desire by the
Town government to cling to a monolithic, single-voice legislature for a
heterogeneous population consisting of many different communities and
voices, I conclude that black citizens' failure to elect representatives of their
choice to the Town Board is not best explained by partisan politics.
Goosby, 956 F. Supp. 326,355 (E.D.N.Y. 1997).
156 Id. at 493.
157 Goosby,

180 F.3d at 498 (Leval, J., concurring).
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Republican Party and its candidates.'58 According to the defendants,
white bloc voting patterns cannot be legally significant under the
third Gingles precondition unless the plaintiffs prove that the
differences are attributable to racial considerations.'59 Under this
view of section 2, the district courts should not consider the totality
of circumstances unless and until plaintiffs have proven racial
animus at the precondition stage.
The Second Circuit rejected the defendants approach. The court
concluded that an inquiry into the causes of white bloc voting is not
relevant at the Gingles precondition stage.'
Such evidence was
relevant, however, in the totality of circumstances inquiry.'"'
Accordingly, the court ratified the approach of the district court when
it considered and rejected defendant's evidence at the totality stage of
the analysis. 6 '
Judge Leval voted to affirm the judgment of the district court, "but
for slightly different reasons."' 63 He began his analysis with a
critique of section 2 and the lack of clarity in the amended statute."
Judge Leval described the amended section 2 as a "compromise that
seeks to have things both ways."' 65 He stated that "interpreting such
a statute poses a particular challenge" for the judiciary.'" One
approach to statutory interpretation, he stated, suggests that judges
should rely on "the text and a dictionary."' 67 Judge Leval opined that
such an approach is useful where the statute provides clear and
definitive instructions, but of little utility when the statute contains no
such guidance. 6
Another approach to statutory construction involves a more activist
approach to judicial interpretation. Judge Leval wrote that where
' Id. at 484.
15 9 Id. at 482.
'60 Id. at

493.

161 Id.

1621d
63

Id. at 498 (Leval, J., concurring).

Goosby, 180 F.3d at 500 (noting that "[o]ne has almost no guidance as to
what illegally lessens the opportunity to vote").
165 Id. at 501 (citing Baird v. Consolidated City of Indianapolis, 976 F.2d 357,
359 (7th Cir. 1992).
164

166Id.
167Id.
'6

Goosby, 180 F.3d at 501.
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"Congress was internally divided or lacked a clear idea as to how a
general principle should play out in specific [settings], a special
relationship . . . between Congress and the courts [arises]."' 6 9
According to Judge Leval, where, as here, the major questions are
unanswered, Congress enters into a partnership with the courts.' 7
Under this method, the courts have the task of interstitial gap-filling.
According to Judge Leval, in fulfilling this task, the courts are
assigned the task of providing answers to the unanswered questions
based on "common sense and good judgment."' 7 ' The goal of the
court should be to "giv[e] effect to the incompletely formulated
intentions and compromises of the statute."'" In his opinion, in the
Voting Rights Act Congress has assigned the courts such a
partnership role.ln
On the issue of intent and its role in the amended section 2, Judge
Leval opined that Congress' intent was stated imperfectly. The
amendment made clear that the statute no longer required
discriminatory intent by a state actor, but was unclear as to whether
intent was banished from consideration.'7" In his view, retention of
the words "on account of race or color" suggests a concern for racebased motivation, at least within the electorate.' 75 Judge Leval also
found a lack of clarity with respect to section 2's requirement that a
plaintiff demonstrate that a minority group has less opportunity to
participate in the political process.'76 He believed that some
violations of the statute might require race-based intent on the part of
officials or voters and others would not require racial animus.'"
After analyzing the statute and its legislative history, Judge Leval
turned to the precedentunder the amended section 2 for guidance on
the intent question; he found little help. He noted that the Supreme
Court has offered no definitive guidance on the issue of intent in
169 Id.
170 id.
171 id.

72 rGoosby, 180
173Id.
174 d. at

F.3d at 501.

499.

Goosby, 180 F.3d at 499. Judge Leval acknowledged that construed similar
language did not require proof of race-based intent. See, eg., Griggs v. Duke
175

Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,432 (1971).
176 Id. at 500.
77
d. at 501.
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Gingles or subsequently. 8 In Gingles, four justices understood
section 2 as requiring no evidence of racial intent, and five justices
expressed different views.1
Judge Leval considered and addressed Justice Brennan's concerns
regarding intent. Justice Brennan, relying on the Senate Report,
rejected the intent test because it could be divisive and would be
difficult to prove.Y° In Judge Leval's opinion, these considerations
should not preclude requiring intent evidence.' He stated that "the
difficulty proving racial animus, in some circumstances, may result
from the fact that there was none."'8 He feared that the invalidation
of election procedures in the absence of racial motivation could
produce enormous disruptions in the political process; a result he
believed Congress did not intend.'1
In his view, "the more deeply judicial intervention intrudes into the
political process, the more reluctant courts should be to find a
violation without a finding of racial motivation."'" He believed that,
in determining the nature of the intent showing required to
demonstrate a violation of section 2, the court should consider
whether the complaint alleges a violation of process or outcome.'
In the former, the law may guarantee a fair process whether or not
the unfairness is the product of discriminatory intent. However,
where the complaint alleges that a minority group has been unable to
elect representatives of their choice, the plaintiffs are complaining
about outcomes. In this species of vote dilution claims, it is
reasonable to require as a predicate for judicial relief that
"discrimination, within the electorate if not the state, has infected the
election."' 86 When discrimination is present, it can be said that the
process [was also unfair in that it was tainted by an] illegitimate
animus." 7 Accordingly, where the complaint alleges only bad
17sId. at 500.
179 id.
11o

Gingles, 486 U.S. at 71-73.

I'"
Goosby, 180 F.3d at 501.
182 id.

183Id. at 501-02.
194
Id.

...
Id.
at 502.
86
17

Id.at 502, n.4.
Idat 502.
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outcomes, a requirement of intentional discrimination would be
reasonable.'
Judge Leval believed such a requirement was appropriate where
the complaint alleges that voters of the protected class have had little
success in electing candidates of their choice. In such a case, the
remedy for the violation "would require a radical political
restructuring - either by redrawing district lines or by changing the
nature of representation from at-large to single representative
districts."'8 9 Where the courts are required to intrude to such an
extent in the political process, Judge Leval contended that more than
defeat at the polls was required."9 Some showing of intentional
discrimination was an essential element.
Having established that intent proof was required in a challenge to
an at-large election system, Judge Leval proceeded to create a
framework for receiving evidence. He concluded that a plaintiff
establishes a prima facie violation by proving the three Gingles
preconditions.' 9 ' Proof of these three factors supports an inference
that race may have been a motivating factor to justify imposing in the
defendant the burden to prove that the consistent defeat of minority
preferred candidates was not the result of race- based intent on the
part of the governing officials or the electorate."Applying his model to the facts of the case, Judge Leval voted to
affirm. He concluded that the district court properly found that the
three preconditions were satisfied, and that the burden shifted to the
defendants to prove that race was not a motivating factor.'93 Based
on the record, he determined that the defendants had not carried their
burden of disproving race-based intent'" Accordingly, Judge Leval
stated his belief that the plaintiffs had proved a section 2 violation.
'88 Id.at 502, n.

4.

'89 Goosby, 180 F.3d at 502.

'90 Id. at 502, n.4.
19'
Id. at 502.
1

9Id. at 502-03.
Id. at 503.
1'Id. at 50. In support of his conclusion that the defendant had not disproved
193

intent, Judge Leval relied on the following:

Racial appeals have been features of Town elections on more than one
occasion. Town law enforcement officers have engaged in race-conscious
policing - - essentially telling black youths visiting from Queens to 'go back
were they belong.' Agencies of the Town government have committed acts
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V. CONCLUSION
The opinions from LUL4C to Goosby demonstrate the complexity
of section 2 and the confusion engendered by its amendment in 1982.
Admittedly, the statute was the product of intense pressure and
compromise. The language and history of the amendment can be
parsed to find that no intent is required and that some intent was
required. There is support in the legislative history for the
proposition that Congress sought to banish intent as a prerequisite for
a vote dilution claim. The Senate Report clearly stated that plaintiffs
could prove a section 2 violation without showing motivation of any
kind. Of course, the Report is silent as to whether a defendant can
offer non-racial explanations to rebut a plaintiffs proof.
Additionally, there is no indication in the legislative history that
Congress, when it rejected the intent standard, intended to permit an
inquiry into motivations of the electorate, while at the same time
excluding from the inquiry the intent of legislators. While Congress
may not have expressed its intention clearly in the words of the
statute, when the Report is examined the relevance of intent evidence
to the vote dilution inquiry is clear - such proof was not deemed
relevant to the plaintiff's prima facie case.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, faced with the uncertainty
regarding the intent question, the courts, as Judge Leval suggested,
have played an interstitial role as they sought to give meaning to the
words Congress used in the amended section 2.
Regardless of
whether Congress intended proof of intent on the part of legislators
or the electorate to be considered in a section 2 case, the courts have
concluded that such evidence should not be banished from the
inquiry.
The next question is who has the burden of proving intent of the
electorate. When the various circuit court opinions are synthesized, a
consistent approach emerges. No court has required that plaintiff
establish through direct evidence that race-based considerations
of racial discrimination to which the Town has made no response. And the
Town has a history of indifference to the economic and social needs of the
black communities within Hempstead, even though they have lower
incomes than the rest of the Town.
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motivated the electorate or the legislature. If such proof is available,
it should be received and evaluated. However, section 2 cases are by
their very nature circumstantial and require a sifting of the evidence
in order to give context and meaning to the nuances of proof. The
circuit courts have consistently stated that when the Gingles
preconditions are established, a rebuttable inference is created that
race is operating in the challenged jurisdiction. Proof of the
preconditions does not depend on the type of searching evaluation
made at the totality stage. In the precondition state, the proof can be
purely statistical without any anecdotal testimony.
Once a plaintiff has established the preconditions, the burden of
disproving motivation is placed on the defendants. They must come
forward with evidence tending to show that other factors motivated
the choices made by the electorate, or, in the appropriate case, the
legislature. Where such showing is made, the burden of production
shifts back to the plaintiff to demonstrate that when viewed through
the prism of the totality test, the minority group does not have an
equal access to the political process and that racial consideration are
at play in the jurisdiction. This requirement is met by offering proof
of the Senate Report factors. A review of the evidence of these
factors gives the district court a sense of the past and present realities
in the community. Where race is a motivating factor, one would
expect that proof of the Senate Report criteria will reveal that,
contrary to the rationales offered by a defendant, race is playing a
role in the society in which the challenged system is operating.
Admittedly, this is a vague and amorphous standard. There are no
clear-cut guides to assist a court in reaching the ultimate conclusion.
The factors are intended to give context and meaning to the inquiry.
In order to evaluate the evidence, the court must immerse itself in an
intensely local appraisal of the political reality of the community.
Essentially, the court is attempting to determine whether a radical
restructuring of a political structure is warranted. Given federalism
concerns, such an intrusion into local politics should only be made
by a federal court after evaluating all the evidence. This approach
gives the court broad discretion to remedy vote dilution violation
upon a review of all the evidence.
There remains a concern that a clever defendant could offer
pretextual rationales designed to mask racial considerations. Where
such proof is offered, the question of how a plaintiff responds is
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complex. First, a plaintiff can attack the credibility or methodology
of the defense experts. Second, the plaintiff can, through anecdotal
testimony, demonstrate that the rationales offered are pretexts for
discrimination. Third, the plaintiff can overwhelm the record with
proof that race matters in the challenged jurisdiction. Of course, at
the end of the day, the determination of the proper balance depends
as much on the judicial philosophy of the trial of fact and the circuit
court that reviews the trial court's findings and conclusion. This is
frequently the case in situations where the test to be employed is a
vague and ambiguous one.
The Voting Rights Act has been a powerful engine for changing
the face of democracy in the United States. Gone are the days of the
literacy test and the poll tax. The Act has ushered in a new day in
American politics where African-Americans can finally achieve
some modicum of political success, unmarred by racism. Yet, the
Act has been limited and restricted by the debate over intent.
Perhaps, when the statute is again considered by Congress for
extension, the intent question will finally be put to rest. Until then,
litigators, on both sides of the equation, will have to struggle to give
meaning and context to the words of the statute and the will of the
courts.
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